Influence, Information Technology & Group Polarization: A Field Study of a Virtual Team by Peng, Chih-Hung & Slaughter, Sandra
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 1 
INFLUENCE, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & 
GROUP POLARIZATION: A FIELD STUDY OF A 
VIRTUAL TEAM 
Completed Research Paper 
 
Chih-Hung Peng 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
800 West Peachtree NW, Atlanta GA 
30308 
chih-hung.peng@mgt.gatech.edu 
 
Sandra A. Slaughter 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
800 West Peachtree NW, Atlanta GA 
30308 
sandra.slaughter@mgt.gatech.edu 
 
Abstract 
This study examines influence and IT in group polarization. Group polarization is the 
tendency of group members to shift their initial positions to a more extreme direction 
following discussion. We hypothesize that informational influence is relatively more 
important than normative influence in causing group members to shift their positions 
and that IT can be used to enhance the effects of informational influence. Our 
investigation of group processes, influence and IT use by a virtual team responsible for 
forecasting ozone levels reveals several important findings. First, we find the 
heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions and greater task uncertainty 
increase group polarization through a greater relative use of informational influence. 
Second, surprisingly, we find that the relative use of informational influence and the use 
of IT for persuasion are substitutive not complementary in their effects on group 
polarization. These findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for 
decision making in virtual teams. 
Keywords:  Virtual teams, group polarization, information technology, influence, persuasion 
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Introduction 
Does group discussion really help group members reach an unbiased consensus? During a discussion, 
group members can exchange factual information and share individual preferences to reconcile their 
differences. In addition, a group can combine information from multiple perspectives to avoid making a 
risky group decision. However, contrary to people’s expectations, group members have a tendency to shift 
their initial positions/decisions in an extreme direction following a group discussion (Isenberg 1986). 
Such a tendency is called “group polarization.” For example, jurors who initially favor a harsh penalty are 
more likely to decide on a harsher penalty after discussion, while jurors who initially favor a short 
sentence tend to decide on a shorter sentence after discussion (Sunstein, 2002).    
In the academic field, group polarization has been considered an important and significant group 
phenomenon. Researchers from many disciplines, including jury decision making (MacCoun 1989), 
organizational behavior (Heath and Gonzalez 1995), information systems (Sia et al. 2002), marketing 
(Chandrashekaran et al. 1996), finance (Barber et al. 2003), political science (Stroud 2010), public policy 
(Paluck 2010), communication (Lee 2007), and economic decision making (Cason and Mui 1997), have 
taken an interest in group polarization. To enhance understanding of why group polarization occurs, 
researchers have identified several group processes and antecedents. Prior studies have proposed that 
either one of two underlying mechanisms/processes can be used to explain group polarization: normative 
influence and informational influence (Isenberg 1986). In the first, group polarization takes place when 
individuals are motivated to present themselves in a socially favorable light. In the second, group 
polarization occurs when group members exchange persuasive arguments during their discussion. In 
addition to group processes, researchers have identified many antecedents of group polarization such as 
pre-discussion individual decisions (Butler and Crino 1992; Vinokur and Burnstein 1978a), risk level 
(Shupp and Williams 2008), group composition (Farrar et al. 2009), culture (El-Shinnawy and Vinze 
1997), and media use (Lea and Spears 1991; Siegel et al. 1986). 
Why do group members polarize their group decisions? Two points motivate our approach to this 
question. The first is the perspective of influence. Group members can make a group decision by using a 
single influence process (e.g., normative influence), but recent studies have underscored the importance 
of the interplay among various influences. The second is the perspective of technology. Information 
technologies are not only communication or decision making tools but are also persuasive tools that can 
be used to change one’s opinions (Fogg 2003). These two motivations are linked to research on group 
polarization. 
Past studies have focused on the investigation of antecedents. To date, however, we know little about the 
process of group polarization. Most of the past studies on group polarization have treated a group process 
as a “black box,” but in this study, we attempt to open up this black box. The first goal of this study is to 
explore the interplay between informational influence and normative influence. Many researchers have 
investigated the effect of these influences on group polarization separately. That is, while some 
researchers have argued that informational influence is a sufficient and necessary process to explain 
group polarization, other researchers have reasoned that normative influence is a major process for 
judgmental tasks. However, to our knowledge, group polarization researchers have not studied the 
relative use of informational versus normative influence. Specifically, relative use is the ratio of the use of 
informational influence arguments to normative influence arguments. An investigation into relative use is 
very critical because the magnitude of group polarization may differ according to influence usage. In other 
words, a group with higher relative use during its discussion may experience a different magnitude of 
group polarization than a group with lower relative use. 
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Moreover, past studies have often considered technologies as either communication tools (e.g., Daft et al. 
1987), or decision support tools (e.g., Todd and Benbasat 1999), or both (e.g., Zigurs et al. 1988). We 
know little about whether information technology can be used to persuade group members during a group 
discussion. Thus, the second goal of this study is to investigate the new role of information technology for 
persuasion in group polarization. Group members are more likely to shift or polarize their positions when 
receiving credible and persuasive information (Barber et al. 2003; Burnstein and Vinokur 1977; Isenberg 
1986). Research on credibility has suggested that the credibility of information can increase because of 
source citations or references. For example, people are more likely to believe a tornado warning 
supported/cited by weather information technologies than they are a warning that is not supported/cited 
by such technologies. That is, a high intensity of informational references is associated with a high level of 
persuasiveness. Therefore, the intensity of information technology references and relative use may 
interact in their effect on the magnitude of group polarization. Another important factor that has not been 
analyzed in past studies is reference to information technology. 
The third goal of this study is to examine when group members may adjust their relative use of 
informational influence versus normative influence. Since past studies have examined links between 
group polarization and its antecedents directly, our study complements these studies by exploring the 
relationships between antecedents and group processes. Two antecedents that may affect the relative use 
of informational influence versus normative influence are (1) the heterogeneity of pre-discussion 
individual decisions and (2) the uncertainty of the task. The goals of this study are consistent with a call 
by Sia et al. (2002) for research focusing on the group discussion process at a greater level of detail and a 
call by El-Shinnawy and Vinze (1998) for research investigating the relative importance of informational 
influence versus normative influence in virtual team settings. 
In addition, we can further enhance knowledge about group polarization by including a field study. Most 
past studies have used controlled experiments to investigate group polarization. Because of experimental 
constraints, these experiments have focused on a single-shot task. Our study can complement these 
experiments by conducting a field study. Our field study allows us to investigate whether group 
polarization still takes place in a repeated task and time-constrained environment. 
More knowledge about group polarization may be beneficial to group leaders or decision makers. Group 
polarization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, group polarization can be favorable. For example, 
if a community, a city, or a country is seriously destroyed by a natural disaster (e.g., a tsunami, an 
earthquake, or a hurricane), individuals may be more generous when helping the victims after a social 
discussion (Muehleman et al. 1976). Thus, we could have expected group polarization to be very useful in 
fundraising activities for the March 11, 2011 earthquake in Japan, the fourth largest in the world, and for 
the May 12, 2008 earthquake in China, which caused over 69,000 fatalities and 18,000 missing. On the 
other hand, group polarization can be very harmful. For example, a weather forecasting group may 
initially issue a hurricane warning, but the group may then decide not to issue a warning after discussion. 
Such a decision might lead to enormous public health consequences if a warning was needed. Another 
example relates to an airline crash. According to the National Transportation Safety Board report, the 
reason that American Airlines Flight 1420 crashed on June 1, 1999, was that both pilots made a risky 
landing decision following a discussion. Therefore, exploring group polarization in more detail may 
encourage a group to make a favorable decision or discourage a group from making an unfavorable one. 
Our research setting is well-suited for conducting a field study on group polarization. We investigated the 
group processes and information technology use of a virtual team responsible for forecasting ozone levels 
for the 5-million person Atlanta region in the United States. This natural research setting provides a rich 
context for examining the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence in an expert 
virtual team. The group’s forecasting task is relatively constant but the level of uncertainty varies from day 
to day. Over a two-year period, we observed individual predictions before discussion, the intensity of 
information technology references used to support forecasters’ arguments, and the magnitude of group 
polarization.   
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Our results reveal several interesting findings. First, we find that the relative use of informational 
influence versus normative influence is an important group process. The heterogeneity of pre-discussion 
individual decisions and task uncertainty cause group polarization through relative use. Surprisingly, we 
also find that relative use and the intensity of information technology references have a substitutive rather 
than complementary effect on group polarization. 
Literature Review 
Group Polarization 
Before Stoner’s (1961) classic study, the conventional wisdom had been that the members of a group 
would make riskier individual decisions than the group did. The supporting argument was that a group 
can combine information from different perspectives and prevent its members from making a risky 
decision. However, Stoner (1961) found the opposite. That is, a group is more likely to make a risky 
decision following a discussion than its typical or average group member. Researchers have called this 
phenomenon a risky shift. In addition, some researchers have found that, in some cases, a group decision 
moves toward a more cautious direction after discussion. Therefore, such movement has been called a 
cautious shift. 
Researchers have considered either a cautious shift or a risky shift as group polarization. Group 
polarization has been defined as the inclination of making an extreme decision (risky or cautious) 
following group discussion (Isenberg 1986; Myers and Lamm 1976). However, an extreme decision does 
not indicate that group decisions have to move to one polar side. Researchers have suggested that an 
extreme decision is a within-group movement, not toward the middle of initial group members’ 
preferences, but toward the initial tendency of those preferences (Butler and Crino 1992; Sunstein 2002). 
Such a group’s tendency can be explained by social comparison theory and persuasive argument theory. 
Social comparison theory posits that people are motivated to present themselves in a socially favorable 
light during group discussion (Baron and Roper 1976; Brown 1986). This motivation may lead to either a 
pluralistic balance behavior or a one-upmanship behavior (Isenberg 1986). A pluralistic balance behavior 
refers to a compromising behavior in which individuals present their positions between what they prefer 
and what their group prefers. A one-upmanship behavior is that individuals want to be distinct from as 
well as better than other people in a desirable direction. Therefore, group polarization results when most 
members of a group exhibit such behaviors, which are considered as normative influence. 
In contrast, proponents of persuasive argument theory have suggested that only informational influence, 
not normative influence, is necessary and sufficient to cause group polarization (Burnstein 1982; Vinokur 
and Burnstein 1978b). The theory has argued that an individual’s position is influenced by the number 
and persuasiveness of available arguments during group discussion. Persuasiveness can be determined by 
two components of an argument: novelty and validity (Isenberg 1986). Novelty of an argument is the level 
to which an argument can shed new insights. Validity is the level to which an argument is sound. Thus, 
group polarization is likely to occur when group members are exposed to more valid and/or novel 
arguments during a discussion. Such exposure of arguments is considered as informational influence. 
Previous studies have debated whether group polarization can be better explained by two theories 
together. Some researchers have argued that persuasive argument theory alone is enough for the 
explanation of group polarization (Burnstein and Vinokur 1977; El-Shinnawy and Vinze 1998). These 
researchers also have argued that persuasive argumentation mediates the relationship between social 
comparison and group polarization. That is, social comparison is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. However, other scholars have suggested that social comparison theory and persuasive 
argument theory together are able to provide a better explanation for group polarization than either one 
alone (Isenberg 1986; Sia et al. 2002). For instance, a meta-analysis by Isenberg (1986) has suggested that 
both social comparison and persuasive argumentation co-occur during group discussion to produce group 
polarization, though the effect of persuasive argumentation is stronger than the effect of social 
comparison. Moreover, many scholars have proposed that both influences should be explored at the same 
time to effectively investigate group discussion (Butler and Crino 1992; Huang and Wei 2000; Kaplan and 
Miller 1987). Therefore, informational influence and normative influence could be considered important 
mechanisms which link group polarization and its antecedents. 
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Information Technology & Credibility 
Past studies have investigated the different roles of information technologies. Most of the studies have 
considered information technologies as decision support and/or communication support tools. To 
effectively make a decision, people can use information technologies to facilitate information processing 
(e.g., Todd and Benbasat 1999). In addition, to clearly express their opinions, people can select 
technologies/media to convey different messages (e.g., Daft et al. 1987). Relatively few studies have 
examined the persuasive role of information technologies. Fogg and his colleagues have defined 
persuasive technologies as tools which are used to change one’s attitude and behavior (Fogg 2003; Tseng 
and Fogg 1999). The tendency of the change is determined by the credibility level of information. That is, 
people are more likely to shift their decisions when receiving credible information.   
Generally, credibility has been defined as believability (Tseng and Fogg 1999). Credible people are 
believable people; a credible message is a believable message. Moreover, Webster’s dictionary defines 
credibility as “the quality or power of inspiring belief.”  
Credibility has been investigated in many academic disciplines such as  communication (Metzger et al. 
2003), information science (Hilligoss and Rieh 2008), marketing (Erdem and Swait 2004), and 
management information systems (Bhattacherjee and Sanford 2006; Poston and Speier 2005). 
Researchers from diverse disciplines together have enhanced our understanding of the concept of 
credibility. However, because these disciplines have their own goals, preferred methodologies, and 
backgrounds, such inconsistencies not only cause field-specific definitions of credibility but also lead to 
different focused dimensions of credibility (Rieh and Daniels 2007). Some disciplines (e.g., 
communication) have paid significant attention to source and media credibility, whereas others (e.g., 
information science) have focused on message credibility (Flanagin and Metzger 2007). That is, whether 
information is credible can be judged from either a source perspective or a message perspective. Although 
credibility can be examined from different perspectives, most researchers have considered credibility as a 
perceived characteristic of information (Wathen and Burkell 2002). 
One stream of credibility research has suggested that source credibility is positively related to the 
perception of credible information. That is, sources with high credibility are more likely to create 
information that is perceived to be more credible than are sources with low credibility. Source credibility 
is determined by two key dimensions (Fogg et al. 2001; Self 1996). The trustworthiness dimension is 
defined as the extent to which a source is perceived to be well-intentioned, truthful, and unbiased. The 
expertise dimension, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which a source is perceived to be 
knowledgeable, experienced and competent.  
In addition to these two dimensions, researchers have recognized that identifying the types of source 
credibility can enhance our understanding of how a source gains and loses its credibility. Tseng & Fogg 
(1999) have identified four types of source credibility. First, reputed credibility results from source labels. 
For instance, the source labeled Consumer Reports is perceived as more credible than the source labeled 
National Enquirer. Second, presumed credibility is based on the general assumptions of a perceiver. For 
example, people often have negative views of car salesmen and assume the salesmen are dishonest with 
low credibility. By contrast, people assume their friends are generally honest, so they consider such 
friends as credible sources. Third, surface credibility indicates the extent to which a perceiver believes a 
source by simply inspecting. For example, users judge a book by its cover. Finally, experienced credibility 
refers to the extent to which a perceiver believes a source by using first-hand experience. For instance, 
interacting with sources over time can help people evaluate sources’ credibility. 
Another stream of credibility research tends to focus on the message rather than the source. This stream 
has discussed the relationship between three message attributes and users’ perception of credibility 
(Flanagin and Metzger 2007; Hong 2006; Metzger et al. 2003). The first attribute is message content. 
Research on message content has attempted to identify which aspects of message content are related to 
credibility assessment. For instance, quality of a message, currency of a message, and the use of citations 
in a message are three possible aspects (Rieh and Belkin 1998; Slater and Rouner 1996; Sundar 1998). 
The second attribute is message organization. Organization-related research has found that the structure 
of a message can influence credibility assessment. For example, a well written message is more likely to be 
perceived from credible source than is a poorly written message (Slater and Rouner 1996). Furthermore, 
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message delivery has been related to credibility (Hong 2006). For example, the speed of loading is used to 
evaluate the credibility of information in a website (Rieh and Belkin 1998). 
Although they assess credibility in different ways, credibility researchers have admitted that assessment 
from either a source or a message perspective is not complete (Wathen and Burkell 2002). It is hard to 
differentiate the impact of source from the impact of message on the perception of credibility. In other 
words, credible sources are assumed to create more credible messages; credible messages are assumed to 
be originated from credible sources (Fragale and Heath 2004). Therefore, source-oriented and message-
oriented credibility may have many overlaps. For instance, the notion of reputed credibility in source-
oriented studies is similar to the use of citations in message-oriented studies.  
Information technology increases the credibility of an argument. One way to increase the reputed 
credibility of an argument is the use of a source reference. In other words, referring to a reference is 
similar to increasing the reputed credibility of an argument. Therefore, referring to information 
technologies can enhance the perception of the credibility of an argument. This implies that information 
technologies could play a role for persuasion in group decision making setting.   
Hypotheses 
Past studies have suggested that two group processes, persuasive argumentation and social comparison, 
can be used to explain why group polarization occurs (Isenberg 1986). Persuasive argument theory has 
argued that exchanging factual information and data causes people to shift their initial decisions in an 
extreme direction, whereas social comparison theory has claimed that sharing individual preferences and 
values leads people to change their original choices. Therefore, persuasive argumentation and social 
comparison are named as informational influence and normative influence, respectively. 
The amount of the use of different types of influence is determined by the nature of the task (El-Shinnawy 
and Vinze 1998; Kaplan and Miller 1987). Laughlin and his colleagues have proposed that tasks vary along 
an intellective-judgmental continuum (Laughlin 1980; Laughlin and Earley 1982). That is, for example, if 
a task is relatively closer to the intellective end of the continuum, its intellective component would 
predominate over its judgmental component. A task with a predominant intellective component can be 
completed by focusing on exchanging factual information. This implies that informational influence 
arguments would be used relatively more than normative influence arguments for intellective tasks. 
Conversely, a task with a predominant judgmental component can be fulfilled by focusing on sharing 
individual preferences. This implies that normative influence arguments would be used more, relative to 
informational influence arguments for judgmental tasks. Thus, to effectively complete a task, group 
members have to consider the relative use of informational influence arguments versus normative 
influence arguments because a task involves these two components. 
In our study, we did not attempt to compare the effect of informational influence to that of normative 
influence since past research has demonstrated the result (e.g., Isenberg, 1986). We also did not examine 
whether the combination of informational influence and normative influence would lead to greater group 
polarization. However, unlike past studies, our study has focused on how the relative use of informational 
influence versus normative influence is affected by antecedents and leads to group polarization.  
Pre-discussion Individual Decisions and Relative Influence Use  
One of the purposes of using teams, rather than individuals, is to bring multiple perspectives to bear on 
important decisions (Hackman and Morris 1975). Virtual teams further enhance the range of perspectives 
by bringing together individuals from different organizations and locations (Martins et al. 2004). In some 
cases, these different perspectives lead to similar conclusions; in others, differences in the ways in which 
individuals interpret and combine data can lead to very different predictions (Priem and Harrison 1995). 
That is, the heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions may be quite different.  
A level of heterogeneity could determine how group members complete their tasks. A higher level of 
heterogeneity indicates that the range of group members’ opinions is wider. To complete a task with high 
heterogeneity, group members are more likely to follow a collective decision. Such following behaviors can 
intensify, protect, or rebuild their self-esteem (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) and also can share the risk of 
making an erroneous decision. Moreover, an increase in heterogeneity makes a task’s judgmental 
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component salient, especially during time-constrained discussion. The salience leads group members to 
pay more attention to social comparison than persuasive argumentation since a group decision will be 
determined by the consensus of preference (El-Shinnawy and Vinze 1998; Kaplan and Miller 1987). 
Therefore, the increased likelihood of following behaviors and increased attention to social comparison 
cause group members to focus on a group process which can facilitate consensus development (i.e., 
normative influence), rather than a process which can help increase understanding of a task (i.e., 
informational influence). That is, we can expect that when heterogeneity is higher, group members will 
use more normative influence relative to informational influence. This suggests that:    
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): Higher heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions is associated 
with lower relative use of informational influence versus normative influence. 
Task Uncertainty and Relative Influence Use  
Research on interpersonal communications (Carlson and Zmud 1999; Daft and Lengel 1984) suggests that 
uncertainty reduction is one important objective. Uncertainty refers to the gap between the amount of 
information required to perform a task and the amount of information the performer has (Daft et al. 
1987). A high level of uncertainty indicates a large information gap. To effectively accomplish a highly 
uncertain task, group members tend to focus on a group process which enhances information sharing 
(i.e., informational influence) rather than a group process which facilitates consensus building (i.e., 
normative influence). That is, uncertainty could be reduced by gathering more factual information. Thus, 
it is reasonable to expect that when the level of uncertainty is higher, group members will increase 
informational influence relative to normative influence. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): Higher task uncertainty is associated with higher relative use of 
informational influence versus normative influence. 
Relative Influence Use and Group Polarization 
Group polarization can be explained by informational influence and normative influence. Proponents of 
persuasive argument theory have argued that group members’ positions can be affected by the number 
and persuasiveness of available arguments during a group discussion. Supporters of social comparison 
theory, on the other hand, have claimed that group members are motivated to act in a socially desirable 
direction. To thoroughly investigate group polarization, researchers have suggested that considering two 
influences simultaneously is more appropriate (Isenberg 1986; Sia et al. 2002). 
The relative use of informational influence versus normative influence can determine the extent to which 
group members polarize the group’s decision. As discussed earlier, a meta-analysis has found that the 
impact of informational influence on group polarization is larger than that of normative influence 
(Isenberg 1986). This finding suggests that a higher level of relative use will lead to a greater magnitude of 
group polarization; a lower level of relative use will cause a smaller magnitude of group polarization. A 
higher level of relative use indicates that, during a group discussion, group members are exposed to 
relatively more persuasive argumentation than social comparison. Thus, the relative use of informational 
influence versus normative influence is likely to be positively associated with the magnitude of group 
polarization. 
 HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The greater the group’s relative use of informational influence versus 
 normative influence, the greater the magnitude of group polarization. 
Information Technology Reference and Group Polarization  
Information technologies can be tools for persuasion (Fogg 2003; Tseng and Fogg 1999). Such tools are 
used to change people’s attitudes and behaviors by increasing the credibility of information received. Fogg 
and his colleagues have identified four types of credibility. One of those is reputed credibility. Reputed 
credibility can be increased by using citations, references, or labels. Hence, information with a reference is 
more believable and persuasive than information without any reference. For instance, referring to a 
technology such as “NAM” model may increase the persuasiveness of an argument about the patterns of 
sea level pressure.    
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The intensity of references determines the persuasiveness of arguments and information. During a time-
constrained discussion, group members have to make a group decision as soon as possible. Thus, group 
members are less likely to exchange messages with many references. That is, the low intensity of 
references in messages can be expected. In our setting, the members of a virtual team can choose whether 
they want to cite an information technology to support their arguments. Citing fewer information 
technologies equals the lower intensity of information technology references. However, the lower the 
intensity of information technology references, the weaker the persuasiveness of messages. Conversely, 
the higher the intensity of information technology references, the greater the persuasiveness of messages.   
Group members’ positions are affected by the persuasiveness of available arguments and messages. The 
magnitude of group polarization should be even greater when both the relative use of informational 
influence versus normative influence and the intensity of information technology references are high. 
When group members are exposed to relatively more informational influence than normative influence, 
group members are more likely to change their positions in a larger magnitude. This likelihood is 
amplified in a persuasive environment. During group discussion, persuasiveness can be increased by 
citing more information technologies. 
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4): The relative use of informational influence versus normative influence 
and the intensity of information technology reference interact positively in their effect on the 
magnitude of group polarization, such that the positive effect of the relative use on the 
magnitude of group polarization is stronger with a higher intensity of information technology 
reference. 
Method 
To evaluate our hypotheses on the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence, we 
conducted a field study. The field study involved collecting daily data on group discussion content from a 
virtual smog forecasting team during ground-level ozone season (May 1 to September 30) in Atlanta, 
Georgia, in 2007 and 2008. The following describes the setting of the data collection and our measures of 
key variables. 
Research Setting 
The setting for our study is a ten-person virtual team responsible for forecasting air quality for the Atlanta 
region. The team is made up of research scientists at a major research university and the state’s 
environmental protection division (EPD). Team members include meteorologists, atmospheric scientists, 
a geochemist, and an expert in statistics, and are located in various parts of the region.  
The primary task of the team each day is to forecast the air quality (i.e., the level of ozone pollutant 
concentrations measured as parts-per-billion (PPB) in the air) for the subsequent day in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area and surrounding cities during the ground-level ozone season (May 1 to September 30). 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies different levels of air quality into six color 
zones, based on ozone concentration values. A value between 0-59 (green) is considered “good”; 60-75 
(yellow) is “moderate”; 76-95 (orange) means “unhealthy for sensitive groups”; 96-115 (red) is “unhealthy 
for everyone”; 116-374 (purple) is “very unhealthy for everyone”; and over 374 (brown) is considered 
“dangerous for everyone,” but conditions in this range have never occurred in Georgia. In Atlanta, smog 
alerts are issued in three color zones: orange, red, and purple. Air quality forecasting is a difficult task, 
and is particularly challenging in the Atlanta area. For example, thunderstorms can unexpectedly develop 
and clear out air pollutants, or accidents can trigger major traffic congestion that increases air pollutants. 
In addition, the smog forecasting team makes predictions for surrounding cities, and a city northwest of 
Atlanta can experience very different conditions than a city southeast of Atlanta. 
This field setting is especially well suited to study the relative use of informational influence versus 
normative influence by virtual teams. The virtual smog forecasting team consists of an experienced group 
of experts whose task, predicting the next day’s peak ozone concentration, remains constant; however, the 
heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions and the uncertainty of a task can vary considerably 
from day to day. In addition, the forecasters use a website to assess information technologies used to 
make forecasts, to post individual predicted value, and to store team’s discussion content. The website 
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allows us to measure team’s relative use of informational influence versus normative influence, the 
intensity of information technology references and predicted air quality level on each day. In sum, 
studying how an experienced virtual team makes high-uncertainty decisions in a dynamic environment in 
the same task over time offers a strong test of the extent to which variations in the decision context affect 
relative use. Moreover, studying such team allows us to investigate how the intensity of information 
technology references moderates the effect of the relative use on the magnitude of group polarization.  
Dependent Variables 
Relative Use of Informational Influence versus Normative Influence (RELATIVE USE): We selected Sia et 
al.’s (2002) coding scheme to classify group processes. Past studies provided many coding schemes (El-
Shinnawy and Vinze 1998; Huang and Wei 2000; Kaplan and Miller 1987; Sia et al. 2002; Zigurs et al. 
1988), but some of these coding schemes have been used in different contexts or for one specific process 
(e.g., only informational influence process). This study chose Sia et al.’s coding scheme because (1) it was 
specifically designed to classify group processes as normative influence or informational influence and (2) 
it can be used to investigate group polarization. Based on Sia et al.’s coding scheme, group discussion was 
coded into five categories (novel argument, valid argument, pluralistic balance statement, one-upmanship 
statement, and other statement). The first two types reflected informational influence and the third and 
fourth types were considered normative influence. The unit of analysis was a sentence which group 
members uttered during group discussion. Appendix A provides a sample coding. 
In order to establish coding reliability, the study included two coders. Coder 1 was one of the authors and 
Coder 2 was a graduate student who did not know any hypothesis in the study. Before coding forecasting 
discussions, Coder 1 studied basic meteorology and weather forecasting for a year and frequently 
discussed coding content with a principle forecaster. We randomly selected 20 of 300 daily discussions 
for Coder 2: five discussions for 4 conditions (high vs. low heterogeneity and high vs. low task 
uncertainty). Since weather forecasters used many forecasting jargons (e.g., BL: boundary layer depth; 
COT: cloud optical thickness) and technology abbreviations (e.g., vis sat: visible satellite imagery), Coder 1 
had to interpret such jargons and technology abbreviations to Coder 2 when Coder 2 was coding the 
discussion content. However, Coder 1 was not allowed to help Coder 2 make any coding decision. 
Following Kaplan and Miller (1987), we computed the coefficient of agreement for each of the 4 
conditions: .84, .89, .90, .96. Overall, the coefficient is .89. Therefore, coding reliability was considered 
acceptable. Both coders discussed with each other to reconcile their coding differences. After that, Coder 1 
independently coded the rest of the discussions.  
We measured RELATIVE USE by the team on a particular day as the number of informational influence 
sentences used during the team’s chat room discussion that day divided by the number of normative 
influence sentences used. This ratio controls for potential differences in the number of influence 
sentences used on a given day. For example, during group discussion, if the team utilizes 10 informational 
influence sentences and 20 normative influence sentences, the relative use of informational influence 
versus normative influence on that day is 0.5. 
Group Polarization (POLARIZATION): Group polarization has been widely considered as a choice shift 
(Zuber et al. 1992). The choice shift is measured by taking the absolute difference between the final group 
decision and the average of pre-discussion individual decisions (Sia et al. 2002; Sunstein 2002). The 
difference refers to the magnitude of group polarization. In other words, a higher value indicates a larger 
degree of group polarization. 
Moderator 
Intensity of Information Technology Reference (INTENSITY): We measured the intensity of information 
technology references by dividing the number of information technology references by the number of 
informational influence sentences used during team discussion. For instance, if the discussion content 
includes two technology references and ten informational influence sentences, the intensity of 
information technology reference is 0.2. 
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Independent Variables 
Heterogeneity of Pre-discussion Individual Decisions (HETERO): Heterogeneity measures the 
distribution of group members’ pre-discussion decisions (Butler and Crino 1992). Such distribution can 
be computed by the variance in the initial individual forecasts on a given day. For example, if forecasters 
made three individual predictions: 75, 80, and 80, the heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual 
decisions would be 8.33.  
Task Uncertainty (UNCERTAINTY): Background interviews and discussions after observing the team 
forecasting process revealed that team members perceived two borders as the most uncertain. The first is 
the yellow-orange border. A yellow color zone does not involve issuing a smog alert; an orange color zone 
involves issuing a smog alert for sensitive groups (e.g., children, elders, and individuals with heart or lung 
disorders.) If the team finds that any air pollutant (e.g., carbon dioxide emission) will impact at least one 
sensitive group, the team will forecast an orange color zone. Conversely, if the team finds that no air 
pollutant will affect any sensitive group, the team will forecast a yellow color zone. Thus, the yellow-
orange border is seen as uncertain since the team has to obtain additional environmental information to 
choose between a yellow zone and an orange zone. The second is the orange-red border. A red color zone 
involves issuing a smog alert for everyone. If the team finds that air pollutants will affect not only all 
sensitive groups but also everyone else, the team will forecast a red color zone. Otherwise, the team will 
only forecast an orange color zone if the team finds that at least one group will not be influenced by air 
pollutants (e.g., young adults with good health conditions.) Thus, the orange-red border is seen as even 
more uncertain since more information is needed for the team to decide between an orange zone and a 
red zone. The team did not express similar concerns about predictions at the green-yellow border as this 
border does not involve a smog alert, so the team did not attempt to identify which color zone is most 
likely. Accordingly, we used one binary variable to represent uncertainty and coded UNCERTAINTY as “1” 
if the initial team perception was within 5 parts-per-billion (PPB) of the yellow-orange border or the 
orange-red border; “0” otherwise. 
Control Variables 
In our analysis, we controlled for other factors likely to affect group processes and group polarization. 
Prior research has suggested that group size (GROUP SIZE) can affect both group processes and group 
polarization (Butler and Crino 1992; Smith et al. 1994; Teger and Pruitt 1967); thus, we include group size 
as a covariate. We measured group size for each day by counting the number of forecasters who 
participated by posting an initial forecast.  
In addition, virtual teams can be composed of members from different locations and different expertise. 
Such differences may make in- and out-group characteristics salient, which would affect group processes 
(e.g., group cohesion) (Martins et al. 2004). We controlled two basic diversities in virtual teams: expertise 
and location. First, the virtual smog members’ expertise was coded based on their academic training. We 
classified group members into six categories: ”Meteorologist”, “Atmospheric Scientist”, “Geochemist”, 
“Statistician”, “Monitoring Expert”, and “Other”. Second, the group members were located at either a 
major research university in Georgia or the state’s environmental protection division (EPD). Following 
past research on team diversity (Knight et al. 1999), expertise diversity as well as location diversity were 
computed using Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index: (1- Σpi2), where pi is the proportion of the group in the 
i th category. 
Furthermore, to control for differences in ground-level ozone concentrations on weekdays versus 
weekends (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2003), we coded WEEKDAY as “1” for Monday to 
Friday and “0” otherwise. Because ground-level ozone concentrations vary by month and year (e.g., due to 
the use of reformulated fuel or shifts in population (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2003)), we 
used four binary variables, JUNE, JULY, AUGUST, and SEPTEMBER, to distinguish these months from 
the base month of May. 
Analysis and Results 
The data on heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions, task uncertainty, intensity of 
information technology reference, and the magnitude of group polarization yielded a total of 300 daily 
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observations from 2007-2008. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables in the analysis. As shown in Table 1, pair-wise correlations between the variables in our analysis 
are modest with almost all well below 0.50.  
We conducted a number of specification checks. We examined our model for multicollinearity by 
calculating a condition index for the whole model and variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of the 
independent variables. As a rule of thumb (Kennedy 2008), a condition index should be lower than 30 
and each independent variable should have a VIF < 10 . The condition index and the VIFs were all well 
below the recommended cutoff value, thus suggesting multicollinearity may not be a potential data 
analysis problem.     
In addition, we conducted Durbin-Watson’s test for autocorrelation and White’s test for 
heteroskedasticity (Greene 2003; Kennedy 2008). As for autocorrelation, Durbin-Watson’s d-statistic 
demonstrated that the result of autocorrelation existence was inconclusive. Thus, we conducted a further 
analysis (see our robustness analysis section). The results showed the autocorrelation was not an issue in 
our data. As for heteroskedasticity, White’s test revealed no diagnostic problem. 
Relative Use of Informational Influence vs. Normative Influence 
The first two hypotheses investigated the relationships between the antecedents of group polarization and 
the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence. Using hierarchical regression 
analysis, we estimated the effect of the heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions and the effect 
of task uncertainty on relative use.  
RELATIVE USE = β0 + β1WEEKDAY + β2JUNE + β3JULY + β4AUGUST + 
β5SEPTEMBER + β6YEAR2008+ β7GROUP SIZE+ β8EXPERTISE+ β9LOCATION+ 
β10HETERO+ β11UNCERTAINTY + ε   
(1) 
Table 2 displays the results of these estimates. In the first step of our estimation, we entered all control 
variables into the model. In the second step, adding HETERO and UNCERTAINTY resulted in a 
significant increase in variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.12, F = 22.67, p < 0.001), suggesting that these 
antecedent variables explain significant variation in the relative use of informational influence versus 
normative influence.  
Hypothesis 1 posited that higher levels of heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions were 
associated with lower relative use of informational influence versus normative influence. We found that 
the effect of heterogeneity on relative use was significant, but the sign of the coefficient was in a direction 
opposite from our expectation (β10 = 0.01, p < 0.01).  
Hypothesis 2 postulated that higher levels of task uncertainty were associated with greater relative use of 
informational influence versus normative influence. The effect of task uncertainty on relative use was 
positive and significant (β11 = 0.38, p < 0.001). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Impact on Group Polarization 
Following a standard practice for analyzing models with interaction effects (Aiken and West 1991; Cohen 
and Cohen 1983), We used hierarchical OLS regression analysis to estimate the effects of the relative use 
of informational influence versus normative influence as well as the intensity of information technology 
references on the magnitude of group polarization as shown in Equation 2 below. This approach allows us 
to evaluate whether the variables add significant explanatory power to the model incrementally over all 
other variables. As can be seen in the Table 3, we first added only the control variables. We then added 
relative use and the intensity of information technology references into the regression model, which 
increased the explanatory power of the regression model (∆R2 = 0.03, F = 4.35, p < 0.05), suggesting that 
relative use and intensity help explain significant variance in the magnitude of group polarization. Finally, 
we entered the interaction effect between relative use and the intensity of information technology 
references into the model, which further increased the predictive power of the regression model (∆R2 = 
0.01, F = 3.88, p < 0.05), suggesting that the interaction variable explains significant variation in the 
magnitude of group polarization over that explained by the other variables. 
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GROUP POLARIZATION = β0 + β1WEEKDAY + β2JUNE + β3JULY + β4AUGUST + 
β5SEPTEMBER + β6YEAR2008 + β7GROUP SIZE + β8EXPERTISE + β9LOCATION + 
β10HETERO + β11UNCERTAINTY + β12RELATIVE USE + β13INTENSITY + 
β14RELATIVE USE*INTENSITY + ε   
(2) 
To evaluate our third hypothesis, we followed the standard statistical procedure (e.g., Greene (2003)) to 
test main effects in the full model. This requires differentiating Equation 2 with respect to the particular 
effect and then substituting the mean value of the interacting effect. To test Hypothesis 3, that the relative 
use of informational influence versus normative influence is associated with the magnitude of group 
polarization, this is GROUP POLARIZATION = ∂GROUP POLARIZATION / ∂RELATIVE USE = β12 + 
β14 * INTENSITY = 0.36 + (−0.72)*0.05 = 0.32. Following Greene (2003) the standard error for the 
coefficient is 0.08, yielding a t value of 4.00, p < 0.001. Thus, we find a significant positive relationship 
between relative use and the magnitude of group polarization, and Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Hypothesis 4 posited a moderating relationship between relative use and the intensity of information 
technology references on the magnitude of group polarization, such that at higher levels of relative use, 
the higher intensity of information technology references would be associated with an even greater 
magnitude of group polarization. As can be seen in Table 3, the interaction effect was significant, but the 
sign of the coefficient was contrary to our expectations (β14 = −0.72, p < 0.05). Our results from 
hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 4. 
Robustness Analyses  
We conducted a number of analyses to verify the robustness of our results. Given the time series nature of 
the data, we evaluated whether serial correlation was an issue. Using the Cochrane-Orchutt procedure to 
correct for potential serial correlation, we re-estimated equations [1] and [2]; these results (shown in 
Tables 2 and 3) produce estimates that are consistent with those we obtained from ordinary least squares 
regression, leading us to conclude the serial correlation is not an issue in our data. 
Past research has proposed that experience can affect how groups interact and perform (Boh et al. 2007; 
Martins et al. 2004). Similar to past research, we measured group experience as the number of forecasts 
the virtual team had made until that day in that year. After experience was taken into account, the 
estimates were still consistent with those without considering experience. Therefore, experience may not 
be an issue in our data.   
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), we conducted a mediation test to confirm that relative use mediates 
the relationships between group polarization and its antecedents. A mediator must meet the following 
conditions. (1) HETERO (β = 0.01, p < 0.01) and UNCERTAINTY (β = 0.38, p < 0.001) were positively 
associated with RELATIVE USE. Thus, heterogeneity and task uncertainty met the first condition; (2) 
HETERO (β = 0.01, p < 0.01) and UNCERTAINTY (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) were significantly related to 
POLARIZATION and, thus, support the second condition; (3) RELATIVE USE (β = 0.24, p < 0.01) was 
positively related to POLARIZATION and, thus, support the third condition. Further, results show that, 
after considering RELATIVE USE, the effect of HETERO (β = 0.01, p < 0.05) and UNCERTAINTY (β = 
0.33, p < 0.01) became weaker, although still significant, which suggests partial mediation. 
We applied a Sobel test to further confirm the significance of the mediation. Results show that the 
intervening effects of relative use for heterogeneity (p < 0.01) and task uncertainty (p < 0.01) were all 
significant. Therefore, the mediation effects of relative use were supported. 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. POLARIZATION 0.26 0.85 1.00              
2. RELATIVE USE 0.54 0.63 0.27 1.00             
3. INTENSITY 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.35 1.00            
4. HETERO 31.49 33.07 0.22 0.26 0.15 1.00           
5. UNCERTAINTY 0.31 0.46 0.19 0.27 0.13 -0.12 1.00          
6. EXPERTISE 0.56 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.00 1.00         
7. LOCATION 0.46 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.23 1.00        
8. WEEKDAY 0.72 0.45 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.15 1.00       
9. JUNE 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.03 -0.40 -0.09 -0.01 1.00      
10. JULY 0.20 0.40 0.01 -0.10 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.25 1.00     
11. AUGUST 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.06 0.23 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.25 -0.25 1.00    
12. SEP 0.20 0.40 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.22 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 1.00   
13. YEAR2008 0.50 0.50 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00  
14. GROUP SIZE 4.71 1.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.11 -0.03 0.07 0.23 0.41 0.20 -0.13 0.10 0.08 -0.11 0.03 1.00  
Table 2. Relative Use of Informational Influence versus Normative Influence 
 Control Variables Only + Main Effects Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
β0 INTERCEPT  0.41 2.82** 0.22 1.46 0.23 1.52 
β1 WEEKDAY  0.02 0.22 0.01 0.11 -0.01 -0.10 
β2 JUNE  0.34 3.25** 0.22 2.36* 0.22 2.55* 
β3 JULY -0.03 -0.41 -0.05 -0.75 -0.05 -0.91 
β4 AUGUST  0.27 1.99* 0.18 1.28 0.18 1.38 
β5 SEP  -0.05 -0.76 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.24 
β6 YEAR2008  -0.17 -2.40* -0.16 -2.57* -0.17 -3.00** 
β7 GROUP SIZE  -0.04 -1.21 -0.05 -1.47 -0.04 -1.26 
β8 EXPERT  0.26 1.28 0.16 0.81 0.17 0.80 
β9 LOCATION  0.35 1.13 0.40 1.46 0.35 1.29 
β10 HETERO    0.01 3.18** 0.01 3.22** 
β11 UNCERTAINTY   0.38 4.61** 0.40 5.31** 
R2 0.09  0.21  0.24  
R2 Change 0.09  0.12    
F  Change  2.27*  22.67**  47.22**  
N = 300. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
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Table 3. Impact on Group Polarization 
 Control Variables Only  + Main Effects + Interactions Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
β0 INTERCEPT  0.31 0.84 0.25 0.68 0.21 0.55 0.13 0.35 
β1 WEEKDAY  -0.04 -0.40 -0.04 -0.42 -0.03 -0.31 -0.03 -0.39 
β2 JUNE  -0.21 -1.55 -0.26 -1.98* -0.27 -2.04* -0.25 -1.86+ 
β3 JULY 0.04 0.33 0.06 0.45 0.06 0.46 -0.01 -0.09 
β4 AUGUST  0.07 0.53 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.14 
β5 SEP  -0.04 -0.41 -0.04 -0.42 -0.03 -0.30 -0.05 -0.47 
β6 YEAR2008  -0.06 -0.61 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.37 
β7 GROUP SIZE  -0.06 -1.20 -0.05 -0.94 -0.05 -1.05 -0.03 -0.68 
β8 EXPERT  -0.78 -1.38 -0.82 -1.45 -0.80 -1.42 -0.74 -1.31 
β9 LOCATION  0.90 1.88+ 0.80 1.69+ 0.81 1.70+ 0.80 1.66+ 
β10 HETERO  0.01 2.98** 0.01 2.31** 0.01 2.35* 0.00 2.10* 
β11 UNCERTAINTY 0.42 3.54** 0.33 3.1** 0.32 3.05** 0.34 3.22** 
β12 RELATIVE USE    0.25 3.6** 0.36 4.13** 0.34 4.13** 
β13 INTENSITY    -0.05 -0.23 0.47 1.57 0.50 1.62 
β14 RELATIVE * 
USEINTENSITY  
    -0.72 -1.97* -0.65 -1.84+ 
R2 0.13  0.15  0.16  0.16  
R2 Change 0.13  0.03  0.01    
F  Change  2.82**  4.35*  3.88*  4.30**  
N = 300. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
 
Table 4. Hypothesis Summary 
No. Prediction Result 
1    HETEROGENEITY, RELATIVE USE  Opposite 
2    UNCERTAINTY, RELATIVE USE + Supported 
3    RELATIVE USE, GROUP POLARIZATION + Supported 
4    RELATIVE USE * INTENSITY, GROUP POLARIZATION + Opposite 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Group polarization is an important aspect of group decision making. Our study attempts to understand 
group polarization from an influence perspective and a technology perspective. This is important because 
little is known about how the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence is affected 
by antecedents and affects the magnitude of group polarization in virtual team settings. In addition, we do 
not know much about whether virtual teams refer to information technology for persuasion and influence. 
An influence perspective is supported by our study. We found that the level of task uncertainty was 
positively associated with the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence. The 
finding suggests that when the gap between the amount of information required and the amount of 
information group members possessed becomes larger, group members increase their use of persuasive 
argumentation relative to the use of social comparison. Contrary to our expectations, we found that 
heterogeneity of pre-discussion individual decisions was positively associated with the relative use of 
informational influence versus normative influence. One possible explanation is that an established team 
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mental model can increase factual information sharing. Members with a history of working together are 
likely to have their team mental model. Such a model allows team members to predict the resource and 
information needs of their teammates and facilitates team decision making (Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993; 
Mathieu et al. 2000). Therefore, when members have very different initial views, they may know which 
information their teammates may ignore. This suggests that when a range of group members’ opinions 
becomes wider, group members who are in a virtual team and know each other well prefer to use 
relatively more persuasive argumentation than social comparison during a group discussion. Our research 
setting was a virtual team whose members had worked together for over 10 years. 
Furthermore, we found that relative use had a positive effect on the magnitude of group polarization. This 
finding suggests that group members can either boost or alleviate group polarization when they know how 
to strategically use different influences. For example, group members can move their group decision to a 
more extreme direction by providing more objective facts and less social norm information. In contrast, 
group members can use more social norm statements than objective facts to reduce the group’s tendency 
to make an extreme decision. Overall, consistent with prior experimental studies (El-Shinnawy and Vinze 
1998; Sia et al. 2002), our field study confirmed that virtual team members had a tendency to polarize a 
team decision following discussion.  
Our study also demonstrates the importance of the technology perspective. Contrary to our expectations, 
we found that the intensity of technology references and the relative use of informational influence versus 
normative influence are substitutive, not complementary in their effects on group polarization. As Figure 
1 illustrates, when relative use is lower, the effect of intensity is stronger. Conversely, when relative use is 
higher, the effect of intensity becomes smaller. Therefore, the figure suggests that the two factors are 
somewhat substitutable. One possible explanation for this result is that people may not focus on both 
relative use and intensity simultaneously. Higher levels of relative use provide group members enough 
factual information to decide the magnitude of group polarization. The facts provided will lead group 
members to focus on informational influence rather than the intensity of information technology 
references. Conversely, higher levels of the intensity of information technology references assist group 
members to invoke more factual information from identified sources. This recall will lead group members 
to consider more information by themselves, thus leading group members to pay less attention to 
informational influence.  
Motivation is another possible explanation. A level of motivation determines which one of two routes in 
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) people use more to process messages (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). A 
high level of motivation leads people to use a central route rather than a peripheral route. The central 
route indicates that people change their beliefs by carefully scrutinizing communication messages. In 
contrast, the peripheral route indicates that people do not elaborate messages, but depend on external 
characteristics of messages (e.g., perceived credibility of the source) to alter their attitudes. However, 
people may use a mixture of a central route and a peripheral route to process different messages. That is, 
they use a central route to process some messages and a peripheral route to process other messages. In 
addition, without strong motivation, some members of a group are likely to have social loafing behaviors 
(Chidambaram and Tung 2005; Karau and Williams 1993). For example, group members may only 
process a small portion of messages. Both ELM and social loafing behaviors suggest that people may not 
put all their effort to process information when making a decision. Therefore, the effect of relative use can 
be substitutive with the intensity of information technology references. 
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  Figure 1.  Relative Use X Intensity 
Our study makes two important contributions. First, our study extends the literature on group 
polarization by hypothesizing and testing an input-process-output framework. Previous studies have 
investigated the relationships between antecedents and group polarization without including group 
processes. Moreover, most researchers have argued that applying either an informational influence 
process or a normative influence process is sufficient to explain group polarization and have treated these 
underlying processes as a “black box.” Our study opens up this black box and also contributes to the 
limited number of studies examining both processes together. We introduced the notion of the relative 
use of informational influence versus normative influence. We found that two important antecedents (i.e., 
heterogeneity and task uncertainty) determined the magnitude of group polarization through the relative 
use of informational influence versus normative influence. Such findings validate the argument that 
relative use is an important process during group discussion. 
Our study provides insights into the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence. 
This relative use is important because decision makers need to know how to increase the magnitude of 
beneficial group polarization and how to prevent harmful group polarization from becoming worse. As for 
an increase in benign group polarization (e.g., making more donations to a community that was hit by a 
natural disaster), our study suggests that decision makers can encourage their group members to use 
more informational influence relative to normative influence during group discussion. As for prohibition 
of hurtful group polarization (e.g., keep investing in the failing Enron Corporation), our suggestion is to 
use less informational influence relative to normative influence. 
Second, our study contributes to group polarization research and IS research by theorizing the persuasive 
role of information technology as a credible source of information. Credibility is believability. The 
credibility of information can be increased by using labels or references. We introduced the notion of the 
intensity of information technology references. We found the surprising interaction effect of relative use 
and intensity on group polarization. The finding suggests that the benefits of these variables are 
substitutive and that their joint effects experience diminishing effects as both variables increase. Thus, 
our study reveals the importance of understanding whether decision makers should increase the intensity 
of information technology references during a discussion. Decision makers who want to increase the 
magnitude of group polarization even more should use a lower intensity of technology references when 
the relative use of informational influence versus normative influence is already high. In addition, this 
finding represents an important contribution to the literature on information technology usage. Recent 
research has focused on two roles of information technology: a communication tool (e.g., Daft et al. 1987) 
and a decision making tool (e.g., Todd and Benbasat 1999). However, our findings suggest that 
information technology can be a powerful persuasion tool. Especially, information technology can be used 
to persuade group members when informational influence statements are shared less than normative 
influence statements during group discussion. Such a persuasive role of information technology should 
provide GDSS system designers with new ideas about how to design a new GDSS. For instance, GDSS can 
include one feature which allows group members to cite information and sources easily. Further studies 
need to be conducted to better understand the role of information technology for persuasion. For 
instance, technology characteristics (e.g., information amount) may moderate the effect of the relative use 
of informational influence versus normative influence on group polarization. 
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Appendix: Sample Coding of Forecasting Discussion 
Categories Sia et al.’s (2002) Coding Scheme  Examples 
Novel Argument 
(Informational 
Influence) 
A novel argument was one that contained facts in 
support of the collective position and yielded fresh 
insights (i.e., it was not related to arguments presented 
earlier). 
Forecaster A: With skies clearing again, 
lighter winds and restricted boundary layer 
depth, I saw us climbing again for O3.  
Note: “climbing” was a new insight. 
Valid Argument 
(Informational 
Influence) 
A valid argument was one that contained facts in 
support of the collective position and reinforced other 
arguments (i.e., it was related to arguments presented 
earlier). 
Forecaster B: Agree with light downslope 
(NW flow) 
Note: One forecaster had mentioned NW 
flow before Forecaster B.  
Pluralistic Balance 
Statement 
(Normative 
Influence) 
A person was considered to have engaged in pluralistic 
balance behavior if he or she moved in the direction of 
the collective position provided no facts in support of 
the collective position (e.g., simply stated personal 
preference). 
Forecaster C: I'll go with 68/19 then and 
update with yellow for both. 
Note: Forecaster C moved his/her forecast 
to 68 from 70.   
One-upmanship 
Statement 
(Normative 
Influence) 
A person was considered to have engaged in one-
upmanship behavior if he or she moved in the 
direction of the collective position beyond the average 
collective position in the previous round, regardless of 
the arguments given. 
Forecaster D: OK then 85/42 ok with me.  
Note: Forecaster D moved his/her forecast 
from 81 to 85. The collective consensus was 
84. 
Other 
Otherwise Forecaster E: Need to vote2-my numbers 
went away again.  
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